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ABSTRACT 
Economic Development and Traditional Cultural Values 
Among the more than 100 less developed countries in the post-war world, 
the economic region surrounding mainland China, including Taiwan, South Korea, 
Hong-Kong and Singapore, have been most successful in their transition growth 
process (1950-1985) from their prewar agrarian background toward what was 
referred to by Professor Kuznets as the epoch of modern economic growth. Why 
is it that these countries have been so successful -5!:.§. compared to other 
regions? 
The economists have identified two causal factors behind the miracle of 
the "Far Eastern Gang of Four" namely, i.e., the openness in orientation and 
the depoliticization of their economic system. As manifested in the evolution 
of their growth related policies in the course of the last 35 years, openness 
and liberalization encouraged "competition". This paper!/ argued that the 
policy evolution has "roots" that reside deep in the traditional Chinese 
cultural values. 
!/ This paper was completed in November 1985 and is to be followed by a second 
paper in which I intend to show that "fundamental" traditional Chinese cultural 
values can explain not only "economic prosperity" but also their relative 
"social-political" stability. 
,;,, . · k.Qnomic Dcve 1 ®Ii:.t:-Dt and T-rad it.~Cultural Value&* 
John C.H. Fei 
Yale University 
November 1985 
From a long run historical perspective, the economic development of 
cont~mporary less developed, or developing, countries after the Second World War 
hns been a unique type of growth exp~rience, i.e. a transition process from a 
colonial, agrarjan heritage before the war to~ard what was referred to by 
Professor Simon Kuznets as the epoch of modern economic ~rowtn. For less 
developed countries, the post-war period is comparable to the transition period 
at the time of tha "industrial revolution" toward tha end of the 18thof England 
· century, or that of Japan· ·toward the end of the 19th century, when, for the 
first time in the life cycle of those economics, the exploration of the 
frontiers of science and technology suddenly became-tee primary growth-promotion 
forces. The post war economic development of China, both in Taiwan and en the 
mainland, is but a typical example of transition growth of the less developed 
world containing three quarters of the total world population. It is not an 
accident that, at tbe present time, a primary concern in both p·arts of a divided 
. . 
Chiaa is the "mcder-,lization by mes.ns of science and technology"• which is indeed 
the .tlne. Q.lJ..a 1l..Qll of the modern growth epoch ( -t~~/2\ ,(~ %- i f. (., 7~ ) • 
*comments by Professor Y. S • Yu C .Al ~ ~, A.'.C -1'~ 
(~ 'f - /.'J... 1:z ) are gratefully acknowledged. 
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I. Ibe Far Eastern Economic Miracle and Traditional ~binese Culture 
• 
Since abou~ ten years ago. it has become increasingly apparent that among 
the mor~ than 100 less developed countries in the world, the geographic region 
surrounding mainland Chin·a, including Taiwan, Sou th Korea• Rong-Kong and 
' 
successful in its transition growth performance, asSingapore has been most 
measured by all types of reasonable statistical indices such as the rapidity of 
the growth of national income and/or the equality of income distribution. This 
•
fact has earned for these four countries. the honored title of NICA -- the Newly 
the Gang of Four of East Asia.• Industrialized Countries of Asia or, enviously, 
,The success of these Far Eastern countries is all the more amazing when, by ail 
consensus, the region is unfavorably endowed with natural resources when 
compared with the oil-rich Arab wo~ld or the natural-resource- rich Latin 
American countries. With its natural resources close to zero, post-war 
· prosperity in the city state of Rong Kong, for example, is often referred to as 
· "the miracle on a rock." 
, .. 
The miracle of the Gang of Four during the last 35 years raises the 
so asfollowing _questioTl: Eby is it that these cou;,.tries have been successful 
tompared to othP~ rezions? The fact·that they are deficient in natural 
resources suggests that this unfavorable econcmi.c-geographic background factor 
1DUSt have been more than compensated for by the comparative abundance of their 
human resources, t·heir laborers, fa~ers ! entrepreneurs and government 
officials. Furthermore, their locational adjacency to tbe Chinese mainland 
tosuggests. that the excellence of their human r~sources may be traceable the 
fact that they shar~d the same cultural influence of traditional China. The 
somecultural self-deprecation of China· since the "May 4th movement" in Peking 
60 yea'rs ago must now be completely reevaluated. For the post-war evidence 
3 
auggest that, with ;eace, traditional Chinese cultural value cannot be taken in 
their entirety as a hindrance to economic modernization. The fact that the 
suppression of traditional cultural values by brute force, has led to economic 
atagnation for thirty years, between 1949 and 1-978 1 in mainland China, can only 
aupport the central thesis which I want to discuss today, namely that some of 
the traditional Chinese cultural values may have been conducive to the economic 
life typical of the modern epoch, and that their suppression was costly in terms 
of foregone economic·growth. 
The economists have identified two causal factors behind this economic 
miracle, namely the openness in orientation ( !5) ~1,{0) and the depoliticization 
of their economic system ( ~ qi 1U ) • as political' interference was gradually 
withdrawn from the operation of the market system ( -?y ,ig ~1/ ~ ) • The prospect 
is that, given the trend of openness, or exte_rnal orientation (A{ -+r 4 {') ) 
sustained, the rapid growth of the Far Eastern region, including Japan, wil~ 
shift the center of gravity of world trade to the Pacific Basin 
from the traditional A~lantic Basin by the end. of this century. While Hong 
Kong, and, to a· lesser extent, Singapore, has always had a depoliticized ma.r1cet 
aystem 1 the maturity.of nationalism has led Taiwan and South Korea to 
aepoliticize their econo~ic systems gradually over the course of the last 25 
years I culminating in the liberalization movement-(-~,:!),<(..~~ ) that has 
recently been "sloganized". What underlies their "openness" and 
"depolitici~ation" is the dedication to i spirit of rivalry (or competition) in 
the international or domestic markets through which human energies and talents 
are encouraged to be devoted to economic creativity rather than wasted in.the 
·pur~uit of "other values" which may even be "higher" from .other points of view. 
While the miracles of the Gang of Four are explainable in these terms by the 
• 
4 
economists, I would like to argue, nevertheless, that their roots reside deep 
in traditional Chinese. cultural values. -
Is there a relationship between traditional cultural values and modern 
economic growth? In his masterpiece on modern economic growth, Professor 
Kuznets, a Nobel Laureate pointed out that 
"The broad views associated with modern economic epoch can be 
suggested by three terms: secularism, e~alitarianism and 
uationalism •••• emphasizing somewhat different aspects of 
values." 
·While the arguments of Professor Kuznets were based on historical evidence from 
'the West, I will argue that· the "internally oriented" traditional Chinese 
cultural values ( ~i '\ /, ij!. di ;J, ~'f i!\1t'iltl-1)'.'.i1;iave always s~tisfied the 
criteria of nationalism, secularism and egalitarianism that accounted for the 
post-war economic success of the Far Eastern countries. 
Since the emphasis of economic modernization 
/ 
is on the relatively mundane 
) aspect of human activities, in our examination of traditional 
cultural values ~ue emphasis must also be placed on the cultural values that 
have trickled down to the lower levels of popular culture ( "'F /A j___ .{.l(J ) • In 
the case of traditional China, it is one of the characteristic features that 
high culture and popular culture were not as sharply differentiated from each 
other, 
regard 
•ex and economics which were regarded as having natural primacy as well by those 
at higher levels ( ~-t,. II 't ~, (t, •:>-$. 1-, f, ) • 
s 
I) Cultural Nationalism as an Aspect of Chinese Cu 1 ture 
In respect to the fir-st criterion, nationalism, a careful distinction should 
be drawn between "political nationalism" and "cultural nationalism". The 
definition of "nationalism" by Professor Kuznet'..s reads as follows: 
"(Nationalism is) the claim of community of feeling grounded 
on a common historical past and its cultural heritage -- in its 
extreme form, an overriding claim of allegiance of the members to 
the larger community and sovereignty vis-a-vis all groups beyond 
that national unit." 
This leaves no doubt that what is beneficial- to modern growth is cultural 
nationalism ( i_,4{, ~ ~'1-..... ) rather than- a _narrowly focused political nationalism 
C ~l •l,!;. ½fU.. l°ID ~ ) with a "xenophobic connotation" when carried to an 
"extreme form". The Chinese political value of a "universal world" (7'. T- ~ .-;_-, ) 
suggests that '°nationalism" in China has always .been of the c~ltural type. The 
acceptance of an openness or external orientation that integrates the domestic 
economy with the res~£ the world in the post-war period was, perhaps, not an 
• . . ;j ~t,JP • . • 
accident since~ in .a.l.l. the successful Far Eastern countries.· -,I 
\ 
, 
Traditional Chinese culture is certainly quite explicit in recognizing ~he . 
historic~! contim:.ity_ of its tradition. This is evident from the "links of 
ai,.cestor ~orship" ( •t ~ lft t.., t~ J-!.-~ ~) applied to the common people ( 1 f! ) 
It is also evident, at the higher level (1:.j\ )_ via the "missionary" dedication 
to the abstract historical cultural "link" stressing the of- commonness 
cultural purpose <-! _!it)) /"'-~. inte~lectuals of all times. The historic 
continuity of Tla Ta..o ( ~ ) linking the past to the present ( tlf t-$ ) is 
logicaliy traceable to the Chinese transcendental value integrating man with the 
cosmos ( ·J! f, I, ) • The Chinese heaven ( 1' ) has it_s own life comparable to 
. . 
human history ( J1t t 1, J. i.. -r.... fx... -Ji, ) • The emphasis of cultural nationalism is so 
•.ft, 1'. 
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unique as an aspect of traditional Chinese values that no further elaboration is 
needed. • 
The urban-centered modern economic-life is far more complex than that of ·a 
traditional society as the division of labor becomes highly specialized and as 
joint asset ownership becomes dominant. The rapid increase in the demand of 
public services -- roads, harbors, communication, water, sewage, the settlement 
of commercial disputes for the enforcement of contractual agreements, etc. 
-requires a polity for the apportionment of tax burdens for their production. 
• Cultural nationalism is an ess·ential precondition for all members to reach 
·A&reement on economic contracts and to compromise in order to form a social 
consensus on·the sharing of tax burdens. The perpetual and rampaging price 
inflation that has blocked rapid economic growth in Latin America, in contrast, 
bas been due primarily to their i?ability to reach a social consensus on the 
· sharing of the tax burden·. Price inflation in the Far Eastern countries has 
been much milder in the post-War period due to their capacity to reach soci2l 
agreement because of their heritage of culturai nationalism•. 
III Secularisn; as an Asp.ect of Chinese Culture 
The second cultural trait, secularism, is defined by Professor Kuznets as 
follows: 
"By secularism, we mean a concentration of life on earth with 
a scale of priorities that assigns a high rank to economic 
attainment •••• as contrasted with a view of life on earth as a 
brief transition phase that deserves .relatively little 
attention•••• the increased power of man over resources provided 
by science that constituted the basia of the view of man as 
captain of his destiny in this world •••". 
"Secularism", as an aspect of cultural traits in t-he West, was achieved 
rather "late" as -it was the product of secularization (-tit"/,,(;;: ;{:,(_J), the most 
--!-?> •t I.> lU,.,(( "- i ~ 
important evolutionary characteristic of Western culture. ( fL,ti t >---A.J•l1i.<<.,<11-'.f) 
~~t--4iw~.
It took the 
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•low disintezr.ation of a personified God ( A_.~ -J(J .l! t ) in the 19th 
century to 'Complete the Western journey of secularization. 
To the extent that secularism is a prerequi~ite for modern economic growth, 
traditional Chinese culture is vastly superior to that of the West as there was 
no need for such a "movement toward secularization.•~ The Chinese culture has 
always been "secular" since at least the time of Confucius. To an 
"unreformed" Westerner, life was indeed a brief transition phase abruptly 
terminated by death and, thereafter, the individual enters heaven (or hell) 
prepared for him by God. This is not true for the Chinese. A person at the 
, . ' . . t,-f:f~,(,L_) 
··higher level of culture C:.l.J$~ 1 b ) is spiritU:ally bound up with heaven ·('f ti ,~ ;,~ 
A "personified god" never existed in.China as· the "other world" and "this 
world" are always integrated. ( i.fil f, A., :;-, A 4J.. - ). 
An impo.rtant point that must not be missed is that the Chinese "heaven" ( i--._) 
is.anything but weak and stagnant. Since the heavenly principle ( @_) is 
vast, strong, righteous and dynamically lively .a.a. mu.at. human bein~s ~- By its 
righteous "breathing" ( ~ ) that is continual (1i 1:f.. ) • heaven is perpetually 
creati~e (j.. ~~ A (·ti 9 't:.) 1 with a vast power to transform itf!elf into mounta•in 
and stars·(~ 'f... ~ 'h ~:.J¢r~ gJt) or into indomitable human beings (~1 /,.. t=1 ;'J,J.!f_ 
). Strengthened by their moral fiber, human beings are perpetually creative 
( tj 8-t/r,t.1'3,tfj, ~,3.j.'f ) with the active behavioral. manifestation 
) &nd an optimistic 
·ln~ Chinese secularism is peculiarly dynamic, with a forward motion highly 
. conducive to ti1e rapid pace of city life in modP.rn times, when rapid growth and 




Chinese secularism is by no means a cultural trait of only the elite (,':;J{5 'i~-
Tbe culture of the lower level (fr! -it.~) reflects the value of "stomach-first" 
plus "leaning on heaven (not man) for his daily bread" with optimism li r,1ri,J}it-~~i 
• If not for this secularism how else can one explain the fact that through 
more than 2000 years of documented evidence on population, the race that 
originated from the Yellow River Valley has multiplied to become the largest 
•tock of human beings on earth, adaptive to all. types of ecological adversities· 
in all five continents? The common Chinese, from the time of the ancient idea 
of toil and rest ce.t1¾{nX, l'iA,.lflJ,~? - ·_). always had priorities that "assigned 
a high rank to economic attainment", i.e. to survive and to be prosperous. The 
Chinese are indeed the most secular people according to the definition provi~ed 
by Prof. Kuznets if we use the size -of population as a rough _index of "secular" 
survival rate, or, indeed, the rate of the survival of the fittest. 
When Prof~ssor Y.uznets visited Taipei in the sixties• he was amazed by t:he 
"running a~d racing" of the pedestrians and t4?ticabs and said to me "here is 
eomet~ing that I don't understand". The "running and racing" 1 . that is indeed 
~be secret of economic success everywhere, is a way of worldly life, ordained to 
have top priority by Confucius ( .A i ,u_ -i, l_ ~L ) in turn ordained by 
heaven. The "practice" orientation of Confucius was much admired by later 
generations, e.g. when Emperor Rsuan-Tsing of the Tang dynasty would humbl~ 
himself before his al tar and ask "Why, oh Why, has your Sage labored so hard in 
). The answer, as provided in a 
•elf-evaluation by the Sage himself was "Tell everyone that he is a person who 
works, forgets meals. always with opti~ism. until his ~last breath on earth. Arid 
.. 
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that is ill•" (~fr J..... ~, ~t l ,~;, -S... ~ ·~ •~ '~ .15• ~o;{l~-t.i,it). This is a personal 
philosophy apparently attributable to Heaven { ~'O ft ~ ~' -i, ..,? ?). 
·-
Chinese secularism is thus not only dynamic but also action oriented in the 
aense of implying energy-consuming phys.ical ~oriduc t ( ~ !J If~,{;~ (o7 J_ At!!: (o). 
This is evident from the "learning by doing" educational philosophy of 
• ('.!L' .ij.AA .. ) the central theme of a philosophicalConfucius ~ Y1i) .,.."'\ .._,, ~ which became 
debate during the years of cultural renaissance in the Sung-Ming Period (i.t-A'b- ~!j 
). This action oriented high-level culture could not but find consonance at the 
lower level (- 1:n.. i.f ft.¼ t. - ~ l..k Ac. ~ lb ) revealing a cultural trait 
· ltP;;,-!r,;r;~±L 
that detests "slogans" li •f,(,. ~ ~l,) and "empty talk without action"(Jj.:t, j/,..:..~ .i..,lj,~~ 
• A dynamic secularism tha_t encourages a dedication to energy-consuming human 
actions is the "secret" of the yellow race. 
With a.high value on economic prngmatism, the contemporary Chinese urban 
vorki~g class would much rather seek "salvation" via hard work in a stable 
political environment than through the invasion and occupation of university 
campuses ( ZA ~.;i ,{t-t&.. .f~@ ) or marching· in' the streets with, to them, 
. 
irrelevent virtues .such as "democracy" upheld. Such energy-consuI!ling •. 
activities, in cont=ast, inevitably created the disturbance to political 
stability so frequently found in the labor movements of Latin America in the 
post-war years. In all the four Far-Eastern ~ountries enthusiasm for the union 
111ovement, if any, has always been an upper-clasc hobby "for" the workers rather 
.!fil!n "of" the workers themselves~ The ''workers are the master" philosophy (.z:.,<.,t -i-A_ 
) on mainland China at the present time is merely an illustration of the same 
truth. in an exaggerated form. which all Chinese can_appreciate much more 
readily than Westerners. 
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• 
Let us now ·examine analytically egalitarianism, the last cultural trait 
mentioned by Prof. Kuznets. A belief that "all.man are born equal" is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for egalitarianism as an operational 
guide for distributional justice. Since, in all societies, the benefit (if ,f::,) 
of high income, social status and power to control must always be allocated, 
eomehow, to all members of a community, rational egalitarianism must be 
carefully distinguished from an "irrati_onal" one which implies quite the 
opposite principle of distributional justice. I will define rational 
-egalitarianism as one that places high value on the principle of equal 
opportunity so that larger- benefits are given, usually by necessity, to a small 
minority, via a selective screening process involving a "test" for meritorious 
performance .. The contemporary COlllpetitive e~amination system or a political 
· elect~on system {~j;1~; are typical examples. I want to make it perfectly 
clear, that AUch rational egalitarianism is my choice of an oper·ational 
, 
When i't co:nes to the "zero-sum games" of most secular affairs, the 
presumption of a "screening test" invariably implies a spirit of rivalry or -
competition. While everyone can try to be a a~ge -C;~fijlt t~) in the 
non-secular domain, for everyone to be the "first" scholar of the land Off,' 7tJ ) 
or "chief" executive <'{~-fl, ~ 4J ) i~ a ma-thematical impossibility. Rational 
. 
.,egalitarianism carries the connotation of competition, .ex. a.n.t.e. and an inegua 1 i ty 
of benefits, .ex. lU)..S.t., for almost all secular affairs. \Jith the definitional 
matter cleared away, we may ·ask. what characteristics of traditional cultural 
values are conducive to rational egalitarianism as defined? 
• 
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The answa :is that rational egalitarianism can
 only be the product of a 
culture, such .a:s the Chinese culture, that b
elieves all man are equal only in a 
f.. A i, ::5 'J,-{.. ,.;i' ,?It IJ ) ·1 f 11 ' .- • ( ;j, ,,.~ f .. · ~-t wh1 e u y recognizing that thepotential sense -;1 • ·f... 141 1, .( 1 "~ -!> 7•~ . . . .,{ ,.., /jd~. ~ -ll• it 1.i}., ~~t,? q ~ ~- )\!. 1r • .JJ- • ., ;.·r ~




i;...,/j:;. ~ c...t,. t:J1'f~ -7, - iS -..,
. 
eo that a. perfect realization of that equ
al potential ( ~,'&, .(ti ,;;Et ,-t_ ~ A.. ) 
is not likely to be observed. Faith in hu
man nature of this type may be 
) pointing to a
referred to as an optimistic realism ( ~ ~ ~ % ;.J~ 
~{:.~-Jii.., tb ~ ~•~f!::-, '.{6JU .!.s/£~17) 
high value attached to individualistic effort to
 achieve ( i>\J..,~t ei3\ A,~~~ ti 3~. 
). 
to the tough moral' fiber to be independ~nt
 ( d! ~ ~'ti t, it~ ;i {t;l,¾H ;:1;_ ~. ) , 
to freedom that can be equated to self-dete
rmination ( 111 l.J ) and• in secular 
to rivalry and the survival of the fi~test
. Modern conservatism, such
affairs I 
·as Reaganism or Friedmanism which has so much f
aith in free competition in the 
market ( ...ytt j;j,=!11:,lf, {j J..r1. :~ :/:, ) always justifies its their position by the 
moral value·of self reliance and freedom. 
Egalitarianism of the irrational variety b
asically denies the principle of 
,. 
"equal opportunity" as, on top of the belief t
hat all men are born equal, all 
111en must also share the "benefit" equally as 
a matter of "pri,nciple" that 
requires rio "test" or "rivalry". Thus the
 Maoist conviction that human beings 
this type of egalitarianism, while modern 
U. 5.
represents an e.xtrr.me case of 
liberalism whic~elieves in helping the po
or by large welfare expenditures to 
The moral foundation of
modify mark~t forces represents a moderate versio
n. 
this belief is either placing a high value on hu
man sympathy Cin the U.S. 
liberal case) or on revolutionary hatred (
in the Hoists case). To some 1 an 
irr~tional egalitarianism as I have define
d i$ no doubt q~ite noble and hence 




clearly recognized but i~ not debatable ( -it•-;, ,;~ \11} ,} ~ ) just as the 
"euperiori ty" of Marxian-Maoism ( 1~ _.;... -b t ~ ) and the 
Three People's Principles ( ) can ..!!.2S. be calmly reasoned about. 
Whether or not traditional Chinese culture is iationally egalitarian. as I have 
defined, is, however, a debatable issue which can and should be analyzed. 
While rational and irrational varieties of egalitarianism may have their own 
merits on other groups, our problem is less controversial. For all we want to 
know is which egalitarianism is conducive to Modern Economic Growth. Prof. 
Kuznets wrote that: 
"Egalitarianism is a denial of any inborn differences among 
human beings unless and except as they manifest themselves 
. in human activities •••• which makes every man a 
full-fledged participant in the community of man •••• (and) 
no allowance is made for innate distinctions hallowed by 
untestable myth •••• One could go on to argue that it is the 
increased power of man over resources provided by science 
that constituted the basis of the view of man as a captain 
of his own destiny •••• egalitarianism contributed greatly to 
economic growth by inducing a much larger flow of talents 
and energy into economic rather than other pursuits. 
The answer is clear: it is rational egalitari~nism and definitely not the 
.
irrational variety. Notice that in the West, rational egalitarianism, as a· 
cultural ·trait, was a·by-product of the secularization movement, when the 
arrival of "science" in the 16th and "technology" in the late 18th century 
created the new "testing laboratory" for individualistic endeavors. In the case 
of traditional China, all this was unnecessary because rational egalitarianism 
bas been highly valued since ancient times. 
V) Bational E~alitariani~m on an Aspect of Chinese Culture 
The belief that human beings are the relat.ively important part of the 
. . 
heavenly universe· ( J,j, J.;t; }_.{..--ht'!~ ft ).j,, j. t~ ·;.~ '",t ~\ ) almost logical Jy 
13 
implies the optimistically realistic view of human 
nature which in turn, implies 
For it is heaven that has endowed human beings w
ith
rational egalitarianism. 
different talents (Jtt. 1' ~- i\P\ .E_.tif)_ but- an equal oppor
tunity to discover 
one's own potential (-1!. H! h ""-~*l~({ ~· n-.z..;i (t., l J1 ~.ft ~ "9!1.i~.!#1 Y.:j j! l>$JP! ~ft,). 
. . • (,.{ ,J li I:-~~ i', ~ • ~ i,IJ. /). ~ -t.:. ') 
is just as vast as that of the heaven itself - 4,,, 
<-- ,A, II.."' .. -p 1n ..i i ~
which °1\ ~.VI,\ (3 !$ •9" ~, '"Jt_,{_J >~ ~~?. 
Bence individualistic endeavors to achieve (TJ\.Al5•e1t,0/t.,?•i3Xf
..;.ip..;,,1111 .~4i. ) 
became the heart of Chinese civilization. (--tp.1i,,-tjge,..<r1·<
-tf1t;t13,ff:~,f:_i-i1-,h-.m( 
( fi~~..ta_.': ;J. ?-f '.,:f~ i ~:-; fjJ -.a,, 1' i f.f)-l ~ f1 ~- , -r- ,-A t . •:r) .~ .i. P9 :~ L~ ·"!!:.- . 
Discimination was an explicitly_ stated ~aboxhile
 social obligations toward one 
another were·represented by the "help others to h
elp yourself" variety, similar 
~ 
to the healthy foreign aid philosophy a=the prese
nt time. (i.t i!,.ij.,i(~_,_:.\.1114·1~, 
The Chinese always believed in a Chinese "persona
lism" ( 'f ,mi {1!l A1if\. 
) that implies a different attitude toward other m
embers of society than that in 
_the Vest at the present time. For the Chinese be
lieve that one has an 
obligation to himself that is almost the opposite 
,
of a corrupted version of 
) under which~ in the context
Western "individualism" ( 
of the pos·t-war wel!are state• "help" from other 
members is considered 
... 
to be 
) as a matter of "human 
right" ( A ~rt- ). While traditional Chinese culture has certainly recognized x.. ·" ,,.l:D • ~ -1... r, -~ .1,,. "- j.<'- f..~ ~:, ,,.,-
h
. " f 11 (;y,, tt,·r .,-- ')'.-., '?f'e":i. ~.;'I. 11e>. ..,:.A.-, :,..,.'J 1 or a ~cot 1ngthe value of a "full stomach" and "warm ~t. /\ oi.~ "I ·:S~,j,u -Sf*! 
). we can, by no stretch of the imaginarion. interpret this con
cern with 
) to mesn the "right" of individuals t~ 
demand full equality of income resembling an egal
itarianism of the irrational 
" . . . w.1-rL- •. • t>'L . . individual rights~ always subordinate tovar~ety. ~, to the Chinese, 
that. was, in turn, centered primarily in 
14 
aympathy for what would be regarded in modern times 1 as the unfortunate 
"unproductive" population <%-¾-t'•:S&.A~,t~t-~ :;J~A~M.1~,:f. J~l.?~~i~. ~~,/i!r-f.) 
Those who are strong and healthy should be captains of their own destiny 
Rational egalitarianism implies a tough moral fiber and the desire to be 
independent. In the West 1 under the veneer of God-defying toughness, a product 
of the individualism of the 19th century is always the God-fearing shame of 
original Sin. ( /...·,r-, ·fr~r ). In China, the toughness of the moral fiber, 
uplleld by Chinese Personalism, knows no upper bound. To be humble ( t~ J.{'-;. ) 
in China is.a manifestation of cultiavted strenth which is different from 
·western humility ( ) where it is a frank admission of human 
weakness. The Chinese haye defied the "establishment" and "convention" by their 
conduct (-to/¾'~ ~.k.+u1~Jf-s•r~l)muc·h earlier than the 20th century "hippies" 
-~and 1 when ~ormented, would not hesitate to defy the heavenly will ( f.. ) 
towards which a dying patient has nothing but contempt (-! f!J 1~ ~ •I· ~"1-l). The 
same toughness of independence is evident in the value system of the lower 
classes for·both males C-1t-'1i-4 ~:.- I> ~i!f-. ti f7Y,' .~ ..<.. 1i+. wt.U c,-.-1 tl<..:~.Ji (..l~~·n 
and females c..,-tt~'~1lA. 4 fl, '1/4.=-. i-Ji.-11~ ~, 1J{-f§1;t tJ, 1:f fi t·/'i. IB~f~i ~•¾. iJ •iji~ h1~irt). 
in thought and practice. Human beings of this caliber may not be altogether 
irrelevant to the avenue of growth through competition that has led to the 
pc,st-War economic miracles of the Far East. 
Rational egalitarianism implies competition in £ecular affairs. Under the 
influence of their cultural values, ·there is little doubt that the institutions 
of traditional China, especially the political and educational institutions, 
where highly competitive - in any case 1 much more so those of the the West. One 
•~ ./4 ~- 7-F t.,Jd! • ) or evenwould not hesitate to compete with the .~ages ( .. .1'1#~6 .t,. ~ ll.. 
with heaven ( J... t ~ r-.. -i4t ~ tf. JJ ro(r, ~, ). The imperial 
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examination system, a 'trade-mark of Chinese culture, was but one example of 
r-tional egalitarianism. At the higher social level, the Chinese spoke lovingly 
of the achievers, especially the culturally refined achievers ( )il;j.u /i :fb ) 
vho excelled in their lifetime (...¢ t~ t:;( ~1?: lt t ~ . ) and were tireless 
(~JH-kA·) · · · . 1 • (....:t;.~ ,16~.;L .Pi:,. ~. 1'I d • 1 • ' / ' .ft•~!~c..! , 1n serious r1.va r1.es .J'"ll,·-154, J.i"v. 1 r,.,-.an , 1.n ess serious "r1V4. r,e5 
( 'f·,tt. -Aj JtO d. . 1 · d h 1 £ • • A h 1 1 1 1~t.tr-tX 1sc1p 1ne t emse ves or compet1t1on. t t e ower eve • to exce 
· ;i•f,. ff1.
in competition, either serious ( ·f -if.l. ~ i~, ~ J... fij_ e{!..), or less seriously ~l$'r'f. ,t;..:i). 
f,}1.'$ "'""" "'14!o'1'11,S a-n t,1,1,y-r11ee,'at~ 11/11.fu.e. .A 'When modern times arrive, !he acceptance of a discipline by competition in 
the marketplace is natural to the Chine~, the "entrepreneurs of South East 
Asia" 1 the -~•oriental Jew" and I statistically, the most welcome customers of the 
casinos in Atlantic City8 E~trepreneurs whfre the captains of capitalism 
receive profit income as ~ reward for their willingness to take uninsurable 
risks.- The Chinese are anything but risk averse! 
In the inter-Ws.r period I Chinese Per-sonalism was often referred to as "a 
plate of loose sand" ( ) that was not up to the task 
) against: £~reign aggression. Indeed. the 
freedom of the "loose sand" can summarize the entire social pe:i;-sonality of the 
However, in the economic arena, this "disunited looseness" may turn out to be a 
cultural strength. The market institution that accommodates individual 
COUlpetitive behavior is peculiarly suited to a people with a cultural background 
dedicated to individualistic achievement. The Chinese consequently feel 
uncomfortable under a system based on "collectivism" and regimentation through 
centralized command. 
post war Far Eastel'n 
•harp contrast to the economic stagnation of the mainland under "collectivism"• 
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a perversion of the traditional Chinese cultural values, a trut
h that the 
CoJDD1unists have learned, belatedly, to their credit. 
VI) Chinese Social Groups and Rational E~alitarianism 
. . 
The above interpretation of traditional values according to 
rational 
egalitarianism must stand up to the leftist challenge that th
e Chinese people 
1were stratified by the "Five Proprieties" ( 
) and, more 
seriously, by the "struggle" between the landlord and landles
s classes. In 
respect to the former, the pair-wise propriety of behavior b
etween father and 
son, ( ) husband and wife, (_ .:f.. 1 ) old and young• ( f.. t,6 ) are 
"natural" iti •that these are the most freguently encountered hu
man contacts in 
daily life for which "rules of conduct" must be prescribed to
 maintain 
.4( "i ) •
.orderliness ( tl
.i. ) instead ~•order" in the sense of command ( 
·Their f~nction is comparable to the traffic light' and the rules f
or driver 
courtesy in modern cities that, by no stretch of the imagina
tion, can be 
Even the
interp~eted as "ordering" where one has to go except by free
 will. 
king's power to rule C.fi- ii:.... ) was not an "inborn-right", as when the king did 
llOt pass the" test of propriety c.Zilfl !,t.•J:...'~ ) ·~ebellion was perfectly jus
tified 
) • Whatever respect a subordinate had for hi_s king ~ff:~~ 
) is comparable to tha·t reserved for the police officer, a s
ocially necessary 
evil, who issues a ticket for a traffic violation in modern times
 
(-§~....<~ !f? ~ ti i. ip-..t ~ ~, '~ li0\~ -:ll-.f-). :fqual_ity under a "natural heavt:n" 
) is far more important. 
For the more serious issue of the class dichotonomy between 
the "landed" and 
•1andless"• Prof. Kuznets made the following ouservation abo
ut the West: 
. ."ln premodern days the· large incomes of the Church were 
felt to be justified because the Church dignitaries were 
assumed to be free from the sins of avarice etc.; those in 
the hands of the anointed nobility were justified on the 
theory of the nobles superiority on religious grounds". 
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Vas "land ownership" in traditional China justified on such "mysterious" 
grounds as the Communists would have us believe? • 
To provide an answer to this question. -we must realize that in all agrarian 
eocieties, land is the basic economic asset. ·The feasibility of interfamily 
social status. andtransfers of the title of land, that carries, with it income, 
power to control is the basic criterion that can be used to assess the 
rationality of egalitarianism. The issue, in other words, is the tolerance for 
the descendants of the landless families ( ~11] lt ~ ~ ~~\ ) to acquire 
titles to land and hence.to their upward climb along an institutionalized social 
ladder ensuring inter-class mobility. Economists have, in recent years, 
gradually come to the vbw ·that an equitable principle is comparable to the 
"rotation of dealership" ( ~ ~~.....{ti i:t.. ) in the game of ·Majong (.fJ i~ ~1) 
. ! where the benefit of dealership ( ;ti.. ~ (✓-f \I~ 4 ) is rotated ar..d 
where 0 consecutive dealership" ( ;,! ~t.. ) is regarded as fair 
·because of the demonstrated skill and/or the luck ( 4 ~ ) of the dealer. 
It is the only principle of distributional justice consistent with the principle 
of "equal opportunity" under rational egalitarianism. Equalization of 
opportunity is intrinsically a "probablility event." The Chinese attach high, 
value to a _heavenly-willed ~ (t t_, ;~~) as a part of distributional 
. 
· justice. A settled colony of Chinese ·is always a paradise for fortune tellers 
with Ph.D. customers in New York Chinatown that are devoted C~ristians! 
I do not .have to dwell on the operati~nal dynamics of the very unique 
11 inter-generafional" land transfer institution that prevailed for some 800 years 
before modern times, ·on the foundations of land inheritance ( .!:. t~ Jft .;,J, ) 
transactions and tenure (..t-t~fi1.:ffl..-fl3-f'/t\. ), all·integrated with the 
i~perial examination _system. The fact that the upper class in traditional China 
was the land owning literate gentry class ({t~ t i~;-dftf-l ~ ,L "":t" t. A rt~. ) 
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testifies to its uniqueness in the world. There were no serious restrictions on 
land transactions, access to education, qualifications to take part in the 
imperial exam or interclass marriage that-blocked inter-class mobility on 
"mysterious", religious• geneological, ·or anthropological grounds (e.g. a cas·t 
system in India, or a kinship system in Japan). 
It was only natural that family fortune "rotates" according to the Majong _ 
s A&~.s. ~ili:,li~--i~ ,t 
principle as the ''be-avenly principle" too ceaselessly rotates <.t1c1i,..],~7 ~ ta. ;t~~··rt?') 
with a natural rhythm that cannot be blocked. Folklore (-f-!i-1~&;)..,,34._k\_.-k.-t~ -JC) 
clwelled on the theme of class mobility so that, for the landless lower clas&, 
a cultural value or an aspiration for land acquisition was probably just as · 
pronounced as the belief in the ceaseless rotation of personal fortune throcgh 
reincarnation ( ~· tt' ;\t. ~~ ) • 
It is not too far-fetched to argue that the traits of nationalise, 
secularism and rational egalitarianism and hence the post war miracle of the Far 
East, can all be deduced, indirectly from the transcendental value of the 
omnip9tence. and Ol'l).nipresence of the Chinese idea of heaven. This surprisingJy 
simple conclusion is supportable by the force of logic as vell as empirical 
evidence. 
Vb.at is to be limphasized is that Chinese rational egalitarianism, manifested 
in inter-class family mobility and land transaction, encouraged precisely those 
"testable" human activities such as hard _work ( "l~ ) • frugality ( 1~ ) 
and, above all, devotion to education that ar~ so essential for modern economic 
growth. The central thesis of Prof. Theodore Schultz (another Nobel Laureate) is 
that human resourc~s. especially education, are the key ingredient for the · 
• 
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contempora·ry less developed countries to be modernized in this age 
of science 
and technology. The Chinese are indeed very well "tuned up" for th_
is effort by
. 
their traditional culture that places so Much emphasis on education 
through 
competitive examinatipn • 
. Contemporary Chinese are not only "well prepared" by their traditio
nal 
culture for "competition" but are "finely-tuned" to immunize themsel
ves from 
) and alienation ( 5-k •~., ..f: ..fV ) that are the well 
recognized diseases resulting from the competitive pressur-es of mod
ern city 
.life. For they know, by intuition, that to be successful in the long r
un they 
) in the economic arena. must compete fairly ( .-i;~ • 
·<-t~•il. t~ f;.1, r~ f~. i.,U,,tcij_ toY. ). ·They are also psychologically prepared by a 
certain calmness ( i..t. ) to accept consequences with 
relativeu, ~- ~­
) to live a busy life with diversionsdetachment ( ~o. ,J;., ~ ~.11=-
. ( t,i} {A],~ -i-, it 11 /2:r ,_-t.b.":1:tnd. to look forward to the days of soul-fulfilling 
, ,Juu, fv tN- '1\ -
retirementl ~f l:.A. 1~ di ~, ~-~ f&, ) • Social aliena;ion is less _of a problem 
.vhen so much emphasis is placed on the harmony of-· "natural" human re
lations in 
daily contact ( ), the modern counter-part of the 
ancient· 
code of "proprieties" ( 'i,~ it_ ). Indeed, the mysterious "oriental attitude" 
that takes the place of tranquilizers and sleeping pills, has alway
s been 
thought to f>e the right medicine, and the "last hope" for the malad
ies of the 
In the years ahead, the Far Eastern regionscompetitive culture of the West. 
aay well turn out to be a paradise_for all except the Western psych
iatrists. 
'11!) (.c-..,t-w1 .:YA'Y'/ f,' -,,/f,'c 4-,,c, ~ & 7..... J,'l,'e ..... / c1,,-,,,.$e' Cu/111-t~ 
In my enthusiasm to put forward a thesis that the attachment of _high valu
es 
to cultural nationalism, action oriented secularism and rational eg
alitarianism 
in traditional China has paved the road for the post-var economic miracles, I 
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might have been carried away and glorified that culture by over valuation. But 
this is only fair! ~ince. for almost 80 year~· now. that cu}ture has been 
persistently und~rvalued, by no others than the Chinese themselves. During the 
movement of enlightenllient in the inter-War period after May 4 • 1919, (..z 
112>l,f¾h), 
the demand was for "total Westernization" <..ti; tiff-tt.~ij \-t/2(J and. much worse. 
during the Post~War sociaiistic transformation ( ,i-t. .{i ~ ~.,,J(J ) the demand was 
for its total annihilation, by hatred and brute force. (4'@1, 11~ i§c.,-ft 
1
4'1@1-..''J. 
Ve must realize that, under the conditions of social unrest, political 
·upheaval and wars, economic modernization is impossible regardless of 
"traditional cultural strength". The experience of the inter-War period cannot 
-be taken seriously as evidence to pass judgement on the relevance of traditional 
Chinese. cultural values to modern economic life. The social scientists and the 
sinologists in this room are, indeed 1 very fortunate as they have the unique 
opportunity to study the s·ignificance of _traditional Chinese culture for the 
modern life of mankind. (fl~{~.$.~lJ-<.Jifil-"t~~A~~ t:is..ith;_ ). The two parallel· 
. . , 
experiments that have taken took place on the mainland and the region bordering 
it over the last 35 years, have already produced a whole set of new inductive 
evidence as Chinese society marched into the mod~rn epoch with an unprecedented 
ep~ed rarely matched in the entire period of previous Chinese history. The 
economic miracle in the Far East suggests that tne chapter of cultural self-,"'
condemnation ( t-\t... ~ ~l ) should be closed and rewritten in .the light of the
\
new· evidence. My interest, however,· has been a narrowly focused economic on~. 
Similar attempts should be made in other areas of academic discipline. 
That Chinese cultural values still live with vitality at the present time is 




attention away from the manufacture of the "new socialistically ethical man" via 
a "Cultural Revolution" and towards the more down-to earth matters •of four 
) represents a secular reorientation. 
lteviving.competition,profit incentives and the inequality of income 
distribution obviously entails an orientation towards rational egalitarianism. 
Rehabilitating the "father land" ( id•~ (,l_ ~~ ) Confucius (~
l! -U.J ) and 
competitive exams represent a reorientation toward cultural nationalism. All 
the evidence points in the direction of the need for a cultural renaissance that 
the Communists can neglect only at the peril of their own avowed aim of the four 
modernizations. (.•D 11i] i'L-'< ,{J6) • 
• 
Apparently the Communists have yet to learn that to insist on 
ForMarxism-Leninism-Maoism is to deny the essence of Chinese cultural values. 
centralized authoritarian command- is an antithesis of self-help and inner 
· strength ( ~ .JJ:• .Z.. '1i ;Jti tJ -t_ )-. Moral values, to the Chinese, can only be 
introspecti_vely cultivated ( 14 ~~... ) through interactioµs with the 
experiences of daily co.nduct ( •3't' q ~ ). · There is always the danger of 
• ~- ;l
the absence of "heart-felt sincerity ( i!,-7 ilh~ ~ ) when moral values are 
thought to be hastily_ manufactured (11t'>t~,~\~f.'½). especially along the 
i'ines of an alien ideology, with brut.al force •. The result, as history shows 
,.,-1-u,.was clearly iisastrous. 14~71 J7-A/1~'- ~ .,,,,.,.., k A'o/i.J.,&. v.,;,,,fwu, ! 
• · If the Commuriists believe that the Chinese "intellectuals, the modern 
)
descendants of a long moral and philosophical tradition ( -J. ~k.; 
can be quieted forever• .they have greatly underestimated the strength of the 
cultural forces that lie behind their tough m9ral fiber. .Intel lee tuals can 
) though not forget the injuries inflicted upon themforgive ( 
.. 
22 
~.,k lt ~ii.. ii-ti1-i.t 71? .:A. 
by those who acted without the strength of freedom (~\~,5,.•A~.~.q;,.,~i!l 
). 
At the present time. the true value of the Chinese intellectuals is 
to provide 
•ubstance to a socialistic society that is truly "Chinese" in the cu
ltural sense 
) not just a geographic concept. 
The sooner the communists end their aimless drift in a cultural vacuum the
 
sooner will a favorable climate be created for the unification of Ch
ina which 









It is·~ratifying to knov that my friend John Fei, an econo­
mist, bas found my preliminary articulatiori of ~he value system 
of Chinese culture helpful to his discussion of China's future
tieconomic development. Humanists and social scientists alike 
have, in recent decades, become increasingly aware of the 
importance of a holistic u~derstanding of a culture system to 
the analysis of any bf its integral parts. The revival of 
-interest in hermeneutics· and in the Weberian approach to 
religious ethic among_philosophers, historians, anthropolo:
.
gists, sociologists as vell as economists is an indication of 
a possible intellectual breakthrough. Should that breakthrough 
eventually take place, we.could surely expect a kind of creative 
syntpesis of the positivitic and the hermeneutic methods in.our 
_inquiry into the human ·as opposed to the natural worl·d. Only 
.then can we possibly take a step_ beyond 
.. , 
objectivism and relativism 
in whose positions both the social and the humanistic sciences 
have long been locked.
-. In his paper on mdoern economic growth and the Chinese 
culture, ~ohn Fei has made intelligent use of the theoretical 
•framework of Simon Kuznetz. But I believe that John's work 
~an be further enriched and refined by also taking into consider­
ation Weber's thesis concerning the Protestant ethic and its 
analogy in East Asia. 
.. 
• 
The little essay I wrote on the value system of Chinese 
culture and its modern significance is no more than a working 
hypothesis. I have ventured to s~ggest~ in that e$$AY 
some te~tative broad generalizations made ~ta high level of 
abstraction which were meant to be suggestive rather than 
conclusive. All of my observations are and must be subject 
to emp~rical tests to be carefully carried out in the various 
relevant disciplines. But it will also require an interdis­
ciplinary approach aij well as a comparative historical persFec­
tive to guide the specialized empirical tests. For otherwise 
the hermeneutic circle would be broken with the whole and its 
parts hopelessly dismembered. Recently John Fei and I have had . . 
many opportunities to exchange views on this vast but extremely 
fascinating subject. Both of us are agreed that we should get 
, 
more people from other fields seriously interested in a common 
effort to re-examine China's contemporary problems in all their 
complexities in light of its cultural values. 
